


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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Washington, D.C. 20451

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

November 2, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Summary of Current Administration Policy
on Outer Space Arms Control

Attached is the subject summary, cleared with the agencies that
participate in the ASAT IG, as requested by Mr. Clark's
memorandum of October 4, 1983.

AH. TCS 814355-83
BYE 3352-83
BYE 3350-83
ER 1642/7-83
BYE 3346-83
ER 1642/5-83
ER 1642/8-83
TCS 814331/2
ER 1642/6-83
ER 1642/4-83
TCS 814331/2
ER 1642/3-83
ER 1642/1-83

W B Staples
William B. Staples
Executive Secretary

Attachment
As stated

cc: The Executive Secretary, Department of Defense
Executive Assistant to the Secretary, Department of Commerce
Executive Secretary, Central Intelligence Agency
The Assistant to the President for Cabinet Affairs
Executive Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director of International Affairs, National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Executive Secretary, Department of State
Associate Director for National Security and International
Affairs, Office of Management and Budget
The Assistant to the President for Policy Development
The Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy

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Summary of Current Administration Policy on
Outer Space Arms Control

1. General

US policy with regard to space arms control was enunciated by the President on July 4, 1982 and in NSDD-42 of July 13, 1982, as follows:

"The United States will continue to study space arms control options. The United States will consider verifiable and equitable arms control measures that would ban or otherwise limit testing and deployment of specific weapons systems should those measures be compatible with United States national security. The United States will oppose arms control concepts or legal regimes that seek general prohibitions on the military or intelligence use of space".

US space activities in support of our right of self defense include deployment of an ASAT system. The US is also working to define an R&D program on defense against ballistic missiles. Deployment of such a defensive system would almost certainly involve space components and possibly anti-satellite capabilities. The advantages of specific arms control options for US security must be weighed against their impact on these plans.

2. International Fora

The US believes that multilateral space arms control efforts should be addressed in the Committee on Disarmament, the principal multilateral arms control forum rather than in other fora.

The US Government is prepared to support a consensus for a non-negotiating mandate for a working group on outer space, in the Committee on Disarmament, provided we have the assurance of the Allies that they support an appropriately worded mandate limited to discussion of issues, and that the US and its Allies seek to achieve consensus among themselves on substantive issues in order to maintain western unity in the working group.

Such a group should address the existing body of international law in this area.

3. Space Arms Control Studies

The ASAT IG is studying the following space arms control options:

- a. No space arms control initiative.

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b. A "Prohibited Acts" agreement, which would ban damaging, destroying or changing the trajectories of satellites.

c. Limitations on activities in outer space (confidence-building measures).

d. Ban on testing and deployment of anti-satellite weapons.

e. Ban on testing and deployment of anti-satellite weapons except for the existing Soviet system and a single US system.

f. Ban on testing and deployment of high-altitude capable ASAT weapons.

The target date for completing the study of the first three options is December 1, 1983. The target date for completion of the study of option (d) is December 31, 1983. Study of options (e) and (f) will begin after further clarification of their definitions and after assessment of progress on study of the other four options.

4. Andropov Proposals

The Soviet Union has submitted to the 38th United Nations General Assembly a draft treaty to prohibit testing and deployment of space-based weapons. Its stated objectives are elimination of existing anti-satellite systems, and a ban on testing and deployment of new ASAT weapons.

Preliminary examination of the Soviet draft treaty indicates a lack of provision for effective verification and difficulties in achieving effective verification of such a treaty. In addition the draft Treaty proposes that manned spacecraft not be used for "military purposes"; this provision could constrain use of the US shuttle for national security missions.

The Soviets have also proposed a moratorium on ASAT testing, at a time when the US is preparing to test its MV ASAT system. If we were to accept such an indefinite moratorium, it would allow a proven Soviet ASAT capability with no comparable US capability.

The Administration considers it unwise to enter into negotiations on space arms control without identification of specific proposals that are equitable, verifiable, and compatible with US national security. Problems that need to be addressed include:

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-- Defense policy: The US must balance limiting threats to US satellites against being able to take action against Soviet satellites that threaten US and Allied forces.

-- Verification: Effective verification is particularly important for space arms control agreements, because satellites that serve US national security are relatively few in number, so that even small scale Soviet behavior of concern could pose a prohibitive risk.

-- Breakout: The US must take into account any Soviet ability to gain unilateral advantages by suddenly abrogating the agreement.

-- Residual capabilities: Non-ASAT weapons systems would not be covered by an ASAT agreement. Any proposed agreement must be evaluated to determine the threat such systems could pose to US space assets.

-- Linkage: The impact of any ASAT curtailment on other aspects of the military balance must be assessed.

5. Summary of US ASAT Arms Control Activities

US efforts toward a verifiable ban on anti-satellite weapons include the following:

-- The bilateral ASAT talks with the USSR in 1978-1979, begun at US initiative.

-- US National Space Policy, which says the US will consider equitable and verifiable space arms control measures, should those measures be compatible with US national security.

-- US participation in discussions of space arms control issues at the CD. The Western Group with US concurrence proposed a mandate for a Space Arms Control Working Group which was acceptable to the non-aligned, but the Soviet Bloc would not agree to this mandate. We expect to pursue an appropriate mandate for this working group when the CD resumes in February of next year.

-- Active ASAT IG assessment of specific space arms control measures, including a prohibited acts agreement, confidence-building measures and various bans on testing and deployment of ASAT capabilities.

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